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I. INTRODUCTION
M ANDATORY arbitration has been the norm in the securities industry
for broker-customer disputes since the late 1980s when the Supreme
Court upheld mandatory arbitration provisions in broker-customer
agreements.1 Mandatory arbitration has been a standard term in such
agreements ever since. Even where arbitration is not mandated by contract,
the Financial Industry Regulatory Association ("FINRA"), an industry self-
regulatory organization, 2 requires brokers to arbitrate all broker-customer
1 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am.
Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
2 FINRA succeeded the National Association of Securities Dealers and the enforcement
divisions of the New York Stock Exchange as the self-regulatory organization for the
securities industry. FINRA handles arbitration of both broker-customer disputes and
disputes between FINRA member firms and their employees, which are subject to a
Arbitrator Background
disputes if the customer so requests.3 As a result, the overwhelming majority
of broker-customer disputes, even those involving substantial sums, are
resolved through arbitration.
4
The FINRA arbitration process has been the subject of ongoing
controversy, as critics have debated the fairness of the arbitration process for
customers.5 This debate is impeded by the limited transparency of arbitration
cases. Although FINRA releases the written decisions issued by arbitration
panels, it does not disclose the details of the claims filed or background
information on the arbitrators who issue these decisions.6 Moreover, under
FINRA's arbitration rules, arbitrators only need to disclose minimal
information in their awards.' In particular, FINRA rules do not require the
arbitrators to explain the reasons for their decision unless all the parties
jointly request such an explanation.8
Studying arbitration is further complicated by a distinctive party selection
regime. FINRA arbitration panels combine industry members with neutral or
public arbitrators, who are private individuals, not employees of FINRA.9
Thus, arbitrators are recruited both from within and outside the securities
industry. From a standing pool of around 6,000 arbitrators, FINRA generates
different set of arbitration procedures. See FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediafion/Arbitrafion/Rules/CodeofArbitrafionPr
ocedure/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2013) (stating that "The Code of Arbitration Procedure for
Industry Disputes (Industry Code) governs arbitrations between or among industry
parties only"). This article only analyzes arbitration that results from disputes between
brokers and their customers.
3 FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes ("FINRA Code") § 12200
(2008), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid- 2403&element-id -410.
4 See, e.g., STMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 648 F.3d 68 (2d Cir.
2011) (upholding trial court's confirmation of $400 million arbitration award).
5 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A. C. Pritchard, Allorneys as Arbitrators, 39 J.
LEGAL STUD. 109, 110-11 (2010) (summarizing criticisms of FINRA's arbitration
process).
6 By contrast, judges' backgrounds are generally a matter of public record. Thus our study,
which is in the vein of a substantial body of legal scholarship about judicial
decisionmaking, see, e.g., Diane P. Wood, When to Hold, When to Fold, and When to Reshuffle:
The Art of Decisionmaking on a Muti-Member Court, 100 CALIF. L. REv. 1445 (2012), is
distinctive in that we have collected data about the arbitrators making the decisions in our
sample.
7 See FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes ("FINRA Code'; §
12904(e) (2008), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid- 2403&element-id -4192
(designating information required in an arbitration award).
s See id. § 12 904 (g).
9 See infra notes 43-75 and accompanying text (describing FINRA's party selection system).
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a list of potential arbitrators for each case, and the parties then select their
arbitrators from this list. 10  This party selection procedure and the
qualifications of the arbitrators, particularly the issue of who constitutes a
public arbitrator, have been the subject of ongoing debate and reform, as
FINRA has attempted to respond to criticism about the fairness of the
arbitration process.11
In particular, FINRA's reforms to the definition of "independent
arbitrator" suggest concern about the role arbitrator background may play in
the outcome of arbitration cases. 12 The party selection process, however, may
mitigate these effects as parties reject arbitrators who may be unsympathetic
to their claims.13 The intersection of these effects raises the question
addressed by our study: Does the selection of arbitrators have an effect on
arbitration outcomes? And are there other mechanisms, such as legal
representation, that may help mitigate any biases resulting from specific
arbitrator backgrounds, particularly ties to the securities industry?
Apart from its effect on securities arbitrations-important in its own
right1 4  understanding the significance of arbitrator characteristics is
important because of the increasing use of arbitration as a potential
alternative to other forms of investor litigation.15 Public corporations may
adopt bylaws requiring shareholders to arbitrate disputes with the company,
10 Id.
11 See, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(n/k/a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.); Order Approving Proposed Rule
Change to Amend the Definition of Public Arbitrator, Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 57492 (March 13, 2008), 2-5, available at wxw.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/2008/34-
57492.pdf (describing various changes to the definition of a public arbitrator designed "to
ensure the integrity and neutrality of the forum's arbitrator
Roster.")
12 Id.
13 Cf Jiro E. Kondo, Self-Regulation and Enforcement in Financial Markets: Evidence from
Investor-Broker Disputes at the NASD (Nov. 20, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (examining effect of arbitrator background on their selection).
14 Customers file an average of more than 6,000 arbitration claims per year. FINRA
DISPUTE RESOLUTION STATISTICS,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalR
esources/Statistics/index.htm (last visited Sep. 9, 2014).
15 See Hal Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandaloy IndividualArbitration
for Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1187 (2013). See also CompuCredit
Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 672 (2012) (observing that "the early 1990's saw the
increased use of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts generally, and in financial
services contracts in particular").
9:43 (2014)
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its officers, and directors.16 This prospect has grown increasingly likely in
light of the U.S. Supreme Court's ever-growing receptivity to arbitration
clauses.1 Understanding the effect of arbitrator characteristics on case
outcomes sheds light on the attractiveness of arbitration as an alternative to
litigation.
Critical to the policy debate over arbitration provisions is the question of
whether arbitration treats small claimants-consumers and customers-fairly.
The literature evaluating the relative merits of arbitration versus litigation is
extensive. Several empirical studies have examined arbitration in the
consumer and employment context, but their conclusions are mixed.18 In
addition, an analysis of arbitrator characteristics fits within a growing
scholarly literature exploring judicial decision-making. Empirical research has
demonstrated that the personal characteristics of judges affect their behavior
on the bench. 19 Do arbitrators exhibit similar partisan or biased behavior?
That question is sharpened by the opaqueness of the arbitration process and
its insulation from appellate review. These factors combine to make
arbitration less closely tethered to the so-called "rule of law." Put less
cynically, to what extent does the individual arbitrator's life experience affect
his or her awards?
To explore the effect of arbitrator background on arbitration outcomes,
we analyze a dataset of randomly selected arbitration awards from 1998 to
2000. During that period, the limitations on who qualified to serve as a public
arbitrator were less restrictive than today.20 We hand collect data on the
background characteristics of the arbitrators who issued the awards in our
16 See, e.g., Corvex Mgmt. LP v. CommonWealth REIT, No. 24-C-13-001111, 2013 WL
1915769 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 8, 2013) (upholding arbitration clause for publicly-traded
REIT). In its public offering filings in 2012, the Carlyle Group initially indicated that it
intended to include a provision requiring shareholders to use arbitration rather than
litigation. The provision was dropped after opposition from investors and the SEC. See
Kevin Roose, Carlle Drops Arbitration Clause From I.P. 0. Plans, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/carlyle-drops-arbitration-clause- from-i-p-o-
plans/.
17 In its most recent decision, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304
(2013), the Court held that arbitration clauses should be enforced even if they make it
impossible for parties to actually vindicate their rights.
is See Choi et al., supra note 5, at 119 (summarizing the literature).
19 See, e.g., James J. Brudney, et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social
Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein,
David Schkade & Lisa M. Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A
Prelimina Investigation, 90 VA. L. REv. 301 (2004).
20 See, e.g., SEC Release, supra note 11 (describing some of the limitations imposed by rule
changes subsequent to 2000).
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sample, focusing on whether those arbitrators: (1) had prior securities
experience, (2) served as professional arbitrators, (3) were retired, or (4) had
previously served either as a regulator or a compliance officer. We explore
whether the presence of arbitrators with these characteristics on a panel
affects the size of the arbitration award. We also explore whether the
presence of counsel affects the impact of these background characteristics.
Our findings are as follows: With respect to securities experience and
industry ties, the characteristics that have been the primary focus of FINRA's
ongoing regulatory changes, we find that securities experience matters-that
is, arbitrators with connections to the industry issue lower awards. That effect
appears to be limited, however, to cases in which the claimant is not
represented by counsel. With respect to professional and retired arbitrators,
whom some commentators have observed might display a more subtle form
of bias due to their desire to be selected in future cases, we find some
evidence that these arbitrators tend to issue lower awards. Further, we find
that this effect is not mitigated by legal representation. Finally, we find some
evidence that public arbitrators with regulatory experience are inclined toward
larger awards if they do not serve as the panel chair. This effect is mitigated,
but not eliminated, by the presence of an attorney for the respondent. We
also find some evidence that there is a difference in awards if the industry
arbitrator has experience as a compliance officer, depending on whether the
claimant is represented by counsel. Our results provide preliminary evidence
that FINRA's focus on arbitrator characteristics was valuable in that such
characteristics do have the capacity to affect case outcomes.
We proceed as follows: Part 2 sets out the background of the FINRA
customer arbitration procedure; Part 3 sets forth our hypotheses; Part 4
describes our sample and variables, and reports the results of our empirical
tests; and Part 5 discusses the implications of our results.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Status of Arbitration
Since the late 1980s, the Supreme Court has taken a consistent position
endorsing arbitration as an alternative system of dispute resolution, reading
congressional adoption of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") as reflecting a
'federal policy favoring arbitration."'' 21 Specifically, the Court held in 1987 in
21 Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (quoting Moses H. Cone
MemoralHosp. v. Mercug Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
9:43 (2014)
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Shearson/Ameican Express v. McMahon that arbitral forums were fully capable
of resolving securities fraud disputes.22 Two years later in Rodrigues de Qujas i.
Shearson/Ameican Express, Inc., the Supreme Court explicitly overruled its
prior decision in Wilko v. Swan and held that pre-dispute arbitration
agreements were valid for claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933.23
Subsequently, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized its approval of
arbitration as offering "lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the
ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes" relative
to litigation.24 The Court has held that arbitration can be used to resolve
claims that would otherwise be brought as part of a class action.
25 Most
recently, the Supreme Court held that arbitration agreements containing class
action waivers must be enforced by the courts even if the cost of pursuing an
individual claim would be prohibitively expensive.
26
The Supreme Court's expansive reading of the FAA has resulted in a
deferential judicial review of arbitration awards. Under the Court's
interpretation of the FAA, courts are not permitted to overturn arbitration
awards on the basis that the arbitrators misinterpreted or misapplied
applicable law.21 Although in the past courts granted motions to vacate
arbitration awards in which the arbitrators were found to have manifestly
disregarded the law, 2 the Supreme Court's most recent interpretation of
"manifest disregard" suggests that this language may just be a "judicial gloss"
22 Id. at 242. The Court based its holding, in part, on the fact that "the Commission has
broad authority to oversee and to regulate the rules adopted by the SROs relating to
customer disputes, including the power to mandate the adoption of any rules it deems
necessary to ensure that arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory rights." Id. at
233-34.
23 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
24 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010).
25 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
26 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). The extent to which
brokers may require their customers to waive their rights to participate in class action
litigation, since FINRA arbitrators do not have the power to adjudicate disputes on a class
basis, was recently the subject of litigation between FINRA and Charles Schwab. See Tess
Stynes & Caitlin Nish, Finra Panel Regulator Can't Block Schwab Arbitration Agreement, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323549204578319933909503430.html
(describing preliminary decision by FINRA hearing panel in favor of Schwab). FINRA's
Board of Governors reversed the hearing panel decision upholding the class action
waiver. William Alden, Schwab Agress to Drop Effort to Prevent Class-Action Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES, April 24, 2014.
27 See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
28 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir. 2006)
(citations omitted).
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on the explicit grounds for vacatur set out in the FAA.29 Lower courts have
read this Supreme Court precedent as holding that the statutory grounds for
vacating or modifying an arbitration award are exclusive.30
These legal standards limit the extent to which courts can review
arbitration procedures for bias. Under section 10(a) of the FAA, a court can
vacate a decision if it finds "'evident partiality"' or 'other misbehavior"' of
the arbitrators.31 Courts have interpreted evident partiality as involving a
relationship with an arbitrator, a lawyer, or a party3 2 rather than an arbitrator's
predisposition or general views about the law or the industry.33 Relevant here,
courts have rejected the argument that an arbitrator's position or experience
within the industry is sufficient to meet the legal standard of bias,3 4 even if
that position might present the appearance of bias.35 Moreover, to the extent
that the arbitrators disclose any potential biases or conflicts, or relationships
that create the potential for bias, courts have held such disclosure insulates
the award from subsequent challenge because a party can respond to the
29 The primary such authority is contained in FAA § 10(a)(3), which allows courts to vacate
arbitration awards only "where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights arbitral proceedings is itself
desirable, reducing the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution." See S/oll-
Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 672, n. 3 ("We do not decide whether 'manifest disregard' survives our
decision in Hall S/reel Associaes, LLC v. Ma//el, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008), as an
independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for
vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
30 See, e.g., Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the common law standards for vacatur are, therefore, no longer valid); Citigroup
Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009).
31 STMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 648 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2011).
32 Id. at 74. See also Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 476 F.3d
278 (5th Cir. 2007) (analyzing the nature of relationships that might require vacatur of
arbitration award for partiality).
33 See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 777 (2002) ("A judge's lack of
predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has never been thought a
necessary component of equal justice.").
34 See, e.g., Positive Software Solutions, Inc., 476 F.3d 278, 286 (noting that "the best lawyers
and professionals ... normally have the longest lists of potential connections to
disclose").
35 STMicroelectronics, 648 F.3d at 74-77. See also Owen-Williams v. BB&T Inv. Servs., 717
F. Supp.2d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2010) ('.It is well established that a mere appearance of bias is
insufficient to demonstrate evident partiality."' (quoting Williams Fund Private Equity
Grp., Inc. v. Engel, 519 F.Supp.2d 100, 104 (D.D.C. 2007))).
9:43 (2014)
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disclosure by striking the arbitrator or seeking his or her removal from the
panel.36
The Supreme Court's enthusiastic endorsement of arbitration suggests
the possible expansion of arbitration as a mechanism for the resolution of a
broader range of investor disputes. In 2012, the Carlyle Group filed a
registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
in connection with its initial public offering that proposed provisions
requiring investors to resolve any disputes through individual arbitration
rather than litigation. Carlyle's filing generated a heated critical response, with
critics arguing that Carlyle's actions were designed to strip shareholders of
important rights.3 Carlyle subsequently withdrew the arbitration provision,
but commentators continue to speculate that corporations may adopt bylaw
provisions requiring arbitration of shareholder disputes.38 More recently, a
Maryland state court upheld an arbitration bylaw in a real estate business
trust, holding that the shareholders challenging the bylaw had implicitly
assented to its terms.
39
This groundswell favoring arbitration has met some resistance. Congress
has considered statutory changes to restrict pre-dispute arbitration clauses.
Concern about the fairness of arbitration to small claimants has led members
of Congress to introduce proposed legislation limiting compelled arbitration
of such disputes. 40 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 authorizes (but does not
require) the SEC to limit or prohibit agreements requiring customers of any
broker or dealer to arbitrate future disputes arising under federal securities
laws.41 Some commentators have warned that limiting customer arbitration
36 See, e.g., Cortina v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 10cv2423-L(RBB), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 92954, at *17-18 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) ("Because the arbitrator disclosed prior
to the hearing the facts Petitioner contends give the impression of bias, his request to
vacate the award based on non-disclosure is denied.").
37 See, e.g., Miles Weiss, Carle Curbing Shareholder Rights Ii/a/es Lawmakers Who See Precedent,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-
26/carlyle-lawsuit-ban-deplored-by-lawmakers-may-entice-followers.html (quoting U.S.
Senator Richard Blumenthal as stating that "The SEC should reject this effort to
circumvent shareholder rights because it will be an extraordinary and enduring
precedent.").
38 See, e.g., Kevin M. LaCroix, More About Arbitration Clauses in Corporation Bj-Laws, THE D&O
DIARY (July 11, 2013), http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/07/articles/director-and-
officer-liability/more-about-arbitration-clauses-in-corporate-by-laws/.
39 Corvex Mgmt. LP v. CommonWealth REIT, No. 24-C-13-001111, 2013 WL 1915769
(Md. Cir. Ct. May 8, 2013).
40 See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. §402(a) (2013).
41 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong.
p921 (2010) (enacted).
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would harm retail investors because of the limited private judicial remedies
provided by federal law in broker-customer disputes.42 To date, the SEC has
not acted on this authority.
B. FINRA Procedures
Arbitrators in FINRA customer arbitrations are chosen through a party
selection system. In 1998-2000, the time period from which our sample is
chosen, customer claims for more than $50,00041 were resolved by three-
arbitrator panels consisting of two public arbitrators and one industry
arbitrator.
FINRA does not impose limits on the background or professional ties of
industry (non-public) arbitrators, and they generally include current and
former brokers, bankers, and other professionals in the securities industry.
44
On the other hand, public arbitrators, also known as neutrals, are supposed to
be free of ties to the industry. At the time of our study, FINRA imposed
relatively minimal restrictions through its definition of public arbitrator. The
definition excluded individuals who had within the past three years been
associated with a broker-dealer, who were registered or associated with a
commodities dealer, as well as persons retired from such positions and
employees of banks and other financial institutions that effect securities and
commodities transactions. 45  In addition, the rules excluded attorneys,
accountants, and other professionals who, within the prior two years, had
devoted twenty percent or more of their professional work to clients engaged
in the foregoing business activities. 46 Thus, at the time of our study, the pool
of public arbitrators contained many individuals with non-trivial ties to the
securities industry.
Both the inclusion of persons with securities industry ties in the pool of
public arbitrators and the presence of an industry arbitrator on the panel have
generated criticism of the FINRA arbitration process. 41 On the one hand,
42 See Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U.PA.J. Bus. L. 101,103-06 (2010).
43 FINRA has now raised this limit to $100,000. FINRA Notice 09-13, 2009 WL 572467
(effective March 30, 2009).
44 FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes ("FINRA Code")
10308(a)(4) (2008), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid- 2403&element-id- 4066
&filtered-tag-.
45 See Choi et al., supra note 5, at 113 n. 4.
46 Id.
47 See id. at 110.
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more knowledgeable arbitrators are likely to produce more accurate awards.
Broker-customer disputes frequently involve technical issues in which
familiarity with industry practices is valuable. Securities expertise enables an
arbitrator to better understand the nature of the claims.48 As some courts
have noted, "The most sought-after arbitrators are those who are prominent
and experienced members of the specific business community in which the
dispute to be arbitrated arose. '49 On the other hand, an arbitrator's
connections to the industry-those same connections that may furnish
expertise-may also raise concerns that those arbitrators may be predisposed
against claimants. Moreover, an industry member's greater expertise may give
their views undue weight with public members of the panel who lack such
expertise.
In response to these concerns, FINRA amended the definition of a
public arbitrator several times to restrict the permitted industry ties for public
arbitrators. In 2004, for example, the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) (now FINRA)5° increased, from three years to five years, the
amount of time necessary after leaving the securities industry to transition
from a non-public to public arbitrator; clarified that "retired" broker dealers
included anyone who spent a substantial part of his or her career in the
industry; prohibited anyone who had been associated with the industry for at
least twenty years from ever becoming a public arbitrator, regardless of how
long ago the association ended; excluded attorneys, accountants, or other
professionals whose firms have derived ten percent or more of their annual
revenue in the previous two years from clients involved in securities-related
activities, regardless of whether the excluded individual represented such
clients; and provided that investment advisers may not serve as public
arbitrators.51 FINRA also extended the industry exclusions to the spouse and
immediate family members of an industry member.
52
In 2007, FINRA further tightened the definition of public arbitrator to
exclude persons who were employed by or served as an officer or director of
48 See Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Economic Recovey and Sustainable Growh Through Reform of/he
Securities Class-Acion Sjsem: Exploring Arbitration as an Aernaive 1 t Litigaion, 33 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 607, 629, 630-31 (2010) (defending expertise of FINRA arbitrators).
49 Int'l Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1981).
50 As noted above, the NASD was the predecessor to FINRA. Prior to the merger,
approximately ninety percent of securities arbitrations were handled by the NASD; the
remainder were arbitrated through the New York Stock Exchange arbitration program.
51 Order Granting Approval to a Proposed Rule Change Relating to Arbitrator Classification
and Disclosure in NASD Arbitrations, SEC Release No. 34-49573, 82 SEC Docket 2403,
2404 (April 16, 2004).
52 Id.
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a company in a control relationship with a broker-dealer, as well as the
spouses and immediate family members of such persons.53 FINRA also
clarified that persons registered through a broker-dealer could not be public
arbitrators even if they were employed by a non-broker-dealer (such as a
bank).5 4 In 2008, FINRA modified the professional disqualification rule to
add a dollar limit in addition to the ten percent limit. Under the amendments,
an attorney, accountant, or other professional was prohibited from serving as
a public arbitrator if the individual's firm derived $50,000 or more in annual
revenue in the past two years from professional services rendered to certain
industry entities relating to customer disputes concerning an investment
account or transaction.55 Most recently, FINRA amended the definition of
public arbitrator to exclude persons associated with a mutual fund or hedge
fund from serving as public arbitrators and to require such individuals to wait
for two years after ending their affiliations before being permitted to serve as
public arbitrators.56
FINRA also responded to those who criticized the inclusion of an
industry arbitrator on the panel.51 In July 2008, FINRA announced the launch
of a pilot program allowing customers to choose a panel consisting
exclusively of public arbitrators. 58 Although the number of arbitrations
conducted under the pilot program was small, FINRA reported that investors
won in a higher percentage of cases when the panel consisted of all public
arbitrators. 59 Accordingly, in 2010, FINRA filed a rule proposing a permanent
53 See Self-Regulatory Organizations; National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto Relating to
Amendments to the Classification of Arbitrators Pursuant to Rule 10308 of the NASD
Code of Arbitration Procedure, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 54607 (October 16,
2006), 71 FR 62026 (October 20, 2006) (SR-NASD-2005-094) (approval order).
54 Id.
55 Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the Definition of Public Arbitrator,
SEC Release No. 34-54792, 2008 WL 762967 (Mar. 13, 2008).
56 Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the Customer and Industry Codes of
Arbitration Procedure to Revise the Public Arbitrator Definition, SEC Release No. 34-
69297, 2013 WL 1384506 (Apr. 4, 2013).
57 See STMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC, 648 F.3d 68, 77 n.5 (2d
Cir. 2011) (describing concerns about pro-industry bias and FINRA's response of offering
all-public panels).
5s FINRA to Launch Pilot Program to Evaluate All-Public Arbitration Panels, FIN. INDUS.
REGULATORY AUTH. (July 24, 2008),
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2008/P038958.
59 Suzanne Barlyn, Finra to Propose Permanent Option ofAll-Public Arbitration Panels, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 29, 2010, 12:01 AM),
http://oline.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870388240457551978248760454
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option of all-public panels,60 which the SEC approved in February 2011.61
FINRA subsequently modified its rule to simplify the selection of an all-
public panel and to make this option available to either party.6 2 FINRA's
website posts statistics comparing the results of arbitrations using all-public
panels and reports that all-public panels granted awards to customers at a
higher rate in 2011 and 2012 than panels including one non-public arbitrator,
although the statistics reported for 2013 do not reveal a difference in win
rates.
63
In addition to the composition of FINRA panels, the process of
choosing arbitrators is distinctive. Since November 1998,64 arbitrators have
been chosen through a list selection system administered by the Director of
Dispute Resolution, termed the Neutral List Selection System (NLSS).
65
During the time period involved in our study, the NASD provided the parties
in each case with two separate lists, one consisting of sixteen public
arbitrators and the other consisting of eight industry arbitrators. The lists
were generated by an NASD computer program using a rotational method,
although the computer eliminated arbitrators with obvious conflicts of
60 Id. See also Order Granting Accelerated Approval of a Proposed Rule Change Relating to
Amendments to the Panel Composition Rule, and Related Rules, of the Code of
Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, SEC Release No. 34-63799, 100 SEC
Docket 1148 Jan. 31, 2011) [hereinafter SEC Release No. 34-63799] (offering customers
the option to choose an all-public panel in all cases).
61 SEC Approves FINRA Proposal to Give Investors Permanent Option of All Public
Arbitration Panels, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2011/P122877.
62 See SEC Release No. 34-63799, supra note 48.
63 Dispute Resolution Stat'stics, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH.,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalR
esources/Statistics/ (last visited May 29, 2014).
64 Prior to 1998, arbitrators were appointed by the NASD staff. Arbitrator Service Survey: Has
List Selection Cbanged How Often Arbitrators Serve? 2006 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1,1 (Feb.
2006), available at http://www.sacarbitration.com/pdf/Arbitrator / 20Service / 2 0 0 0 -
05.pdf.
65 The NASD's Neutral List Selection System (NLSS) went into effect on November 17,
1998. The NLSS was proposed by the NASD Arbitration Policy Task Force as part of its
1996 Securities Arbitration Reform Report and modeled after the list selection system
used by the American Arbitration Association. The report recommended that panels for
larger cases continue to be composed of one industry member and two public arbitrators.
The report recommended improving the quality of arbitrators by increased arbitrator
compensation, better training, expanding the arbitrator pool and requiring arbitrator
evaluation of co-panelists. Press Release, NASD Regulation, SEC Approves List Selection
Method for NASD Regulation Arbitration Forum (October 22, 1998), available at
https://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/1 998/P01 0433.
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interest.66 Along with the lists, the parties were also provided with
background information on each arbitrator, including a copy of that
arbitrator's Arbitrator Disclosure Report.6 NASD rules then allowed parties
to strike, without cause, prospective panelists and required the parties to rank
numerically the remaining arbitrators until they reached agreement on a panel.
Importantly, list selection operated, at the time of our study, on a free strike
basis, in which the parties were not limited in the number of prospective
arbitrators they could strike.68 As a result, it was possible for the selection
process to result in an incomplete panel.6 9 If this happened, the NASD would
appoint an additional arbitrator selected randomly by computer, and the
parties were not given the option of striking this additional arbitrator.10
FINRA subsequently changed this procedure in three significant ways."
First, at the time of our study the public arbitrator ranked most highly by all
the parties was appointed as chair of the panel. In 2006, FINRA adopted
specific qualifications for panel chairs.12 To implement the qualification
requirements, the list section system was modified to generate three separate
lists of eight potential arbitrators: a chair-qualified list, another public list, and
a non-public list."3 Then, in 2007, FINRA instituted limits on party strikes-
limiting the parties to four strikes from each list of eight potential
66 The NASD shifted from a rotational method to a random selection method in 2005.
Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Random
Selection of Arbitrators by the Neutral List Selection System, SEC Release No. 34-51083
January 26, 2005), available at www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/34-51083.pdf.
67 See STMicroelectronics, N.V. v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 648 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir.
2011) (describing selection process and Arbitrator Disclosure Reports). Parties were
allowed to request additional information on the arbitrators, and the NASD director was
required to forward that request to the arbitrators, although the arbitrators were not
required to respond.
68 Self-Regulatory Organizations; Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.; Notice of
Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to Amending the Codes of Arbitration
Procedure to Increase the Number of Arbitrators on Lists Generated by the Neutral List




71 Paul A. Fischer & Robin M. Sanders, How Changes To The NASD Code Of Arbitration
Procedure Maj Affect Customer Arbitrations, METRO. CORP. COUNSEL (Aug. 1, 2007)
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/8629/how-changes-nasd-code-arbitration-
procedure-may-affect-customer-arbitrations.
72 To be "chair-qualified," an arbitrator was required to have a law degree or experience on
at least three prior cases, as well as otherwise meet the definition of a public arbitrator.




arbitrators.14 This change reduced the likelihood of an incomplete panel
because some arbitrators were unable to serve or subsequently challenged for
cause. To further address this concern, FINRA amended the selection system
to expand the list of potential arbitrators from eight to ten in 2010.1
As noted above, our empirical study focuses on the 1998 to 2000 time
period. Focusing on the 1998 to 2000 period as opposed to more recent
arbitration awards allows us to test the need for the subsequent FINRA
reforms and whether FINRA could have pursued less restrictive alternatives.
Because our study focuses on a period of time when individuals could more
easily qualify as public arbitrators, we are able to study the effect of arbitrator
characteristics that, in some cases, FINRA now treats as disqualifying. We are
also able to study whether legal representation for claimants may act as an
alternative mechanism to address arbitrator bias.
Although FINRA has attempted to reduce arbitral bias through expanded
grounds for disqualification, these reforms carry a cost-excluding potentially
experienced and high-quality arbitrators from the pool of FINRA arbitrators.
If attorneys for claimants can mitigate the negative impact of bias, FINRA's
efforts may have been misdirected; focusing on representation for FINRA
arbitration claimants may have done more to level the playing field.
C. Prior Literature
In addition to our own prior work,6 a few articles specifically study the
FINRA arbitration process." Among the challenges faced by these studies is
the absence of a baseline. Arbitration decisions rarely report details of the
underlying claim, providing researchers with little basis for assessing case
merits. As a result, the studies rely largely on survey data examining the extent
to which arbitration participants report satisfaction with the system.71
74 Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendments to Amend NASD Arbitration
Rules for Customer Disputes; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change and Amendments
to Amend NASD Arbitration Rules for Industry Disputes, SEC Release No. 34-55158
January 24, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/2007 /34- 55158.pdf.
75 Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amending the Codes of Arbitration
Procedure to Increase the Number of Arbitrators on Lists Generated by the Neutral List
Selection System, SEC Release No. 34-62480 (July 9, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/finra/2010/34-62480.pdf.
76 See Choi et al., supra note 5.
77 Id. at 116-19.
78 See, e.g., Jill 1. Gross & Barbara Black, Wben Perception Cbanges Reality: An Empirical Sldy of
Investors' Views of /he Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. Disp. RESOL. 349, 380 (2008).
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Two recent studies go beyond participant satisfaction and collect
information on arbitration process and outcomes. 9 Both report a trend
toward less favorable decisions for claimants. Jiro E. Kondo finds that, since
the adoption of the party selection system by FINRA, selection of pro-
industry arbitrators has increased, and selection of arbitrators based on their
expertise has declined.80 Lawrence S. Schultz finds a trend toward fewer
customer wins.81
These trends may be due to the effect of party selection of arbitrators,
which may favor brokerage firms, who are repeat players, in securities
arbitrations.8 2 The repeat player advantage may include both the ability to
screen potential arbitrators effectively and the ability to discipline arbitrators
who rule against defendants by refusing to select them in subsequent cases.83
Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman hypothesize that arbitrators acting
strategically in a private party selection system skew their decisions in order to
increase the likelihood that they will be selected in the future.8 4 Such a bias
would likely cause arbitrators to favor brokers rather than customers because
brokers and their firms are more likely to participate in future cases, while
customers are likely to be single-shot litigants. We explore this possibility in
our empirical analysis by focusing on the decisions of both professional and
retired arbitrators.
D. Party Selection and the Judicial Decision-making Literature
Studies of the FINRA arbitration process have paid little attention to the
party selection system and its relationship to the literature on judicial
decision-making. A substantial literature explores the relationship between
particular judicial characteristics and the outcomes of cases that they decide.
8 5
79 Kondo, supra note 13; Laurence S. Schultz, Storm Clouds in Arbitration, 15 PIABA B.J. 16, 21
(2008).
so Kondo, supra note 13.
s1 Schultz, supra note 79.
82 Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Stud of Employment Arbitration: Case Ou/comes and
Processes, 8 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 1, 21 (2011) (reporting strong evidence of repeat player
advantage in employment arbitration).
83 See, e.g., John O'Donnell, The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare Customers,
PUB. CITIZEN (Sept. 2007),
http://www.citizen.org/publications/publicationredirect.cfm?ID- 7545.
84 Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman, Private Selection and Arbitrator Impartialiy, Soc. ScI.
RESEARCH CTR. (March 31, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract- 1800026.
s5 See, e.g., Ric Simmons, Choose-yozuqzudges.org: Treating Elected Judges as Politicans, 45 AKRON L.
REV. 1, 20 (2012) (observing that "legal and political science scholars have conducted
hundreds of studies on the voting behavior of judges").
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The majority of these studies seek to analyze the relationship between judicial
ideology and voting outcomes.86 An important study by William Landes and
Richard Posner comprehensively analyzes the relationship between ideology
and judicial voting behavior over a seventy-seven year period.8 Like many
similar studies, Landes and Posner report a correlation between ideology and
voting, although they note that the correlation depends heavily on the
context.88  Studies also focus on the effect of other judge-specific
characteristics such as race and gender on judicial voting or case outcomes.
These studies reach mixed results-some document racial or gender
differences; others do not find significant differences.8 9
Landes and Posner also demonstrate the presence of group or panel
effects, such as conformity and polarization, in cases involving panels with
more than one judge, such as the U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Supreme
Court.90 Other studies document collegial effects, suggesting that a focus on
individual judicial preferences or characteristics may be too narrow.91 We
address the potential for panel effect in our study by collecting and coding for
characteristics of individual arbitrators. Because of the potentially more
significant role of the panel chair, we also code characteristics of the chair and
the second public arbitrator separately.
86 Studies also look at particular aspects of a judge's background or experience. See, e.g.,
Michael C. Dorf, Does Federal Executive Branch Experience Explain Whj Some Republican
Supreme Court jus/ices 'Evolve" and Others Don'l?, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 457, 462-67
(2007) (concluding that Supreme Court Justices without prior judicial experience tend to
become more liberal, while those with prior judicial experience do not).
87 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, RationalJudicial Behavior: A Statistical Sud, 1 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 775 (2009). Landes and Posner coded information on judicial gender
and race, and found no correlation between these variables and voting behavior. Id at
811. In unreported regressions, we analyze the effect of arbitrator gender on case
outcomes and find no significant relationship.
88 Id. at 822-25. A prominent earlier study failed to find a significant relationship between
judicial characteristics and outcomes in a large sample of civil rights cases. Orley
Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciagy: The Influence
ofJudicialBackgroundon Case Outcomes, 24J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 281 (1995).
89 See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, The Realism of Race in Jtdical Decision Making: An
EmpincalAnaysis of Plaintifls' Race and Judges' Race, 28 HARV.J. ON RACE & ETHNIC JUST. 91
(2012) (exploring the effect of judicial race on case outcomes); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note,
Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114
YALE L.J. 1759, 1762-68 (2005) (describing various studies on the effect of gender on
case outcomes).
90 Landes & Posner, supra note 71 at 818-21.
91 See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegialiy on i judicial Decsion Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1639, 1652-62 (2003); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sage, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1993).
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We also note that the decision makers in the FINRA system function as a
type of hybrid between a judge and a jury. The potential effect of juror
experience as well as race, gender, and other juror characteristics has led to a
complex system of jury selection. Given the potential significance of juror
selection, a literature has developed on the extent to which it is appropriate
for parties to consider certain characteristics in the selection or challenge of
jurors.9 2 The parties to a FINRA arbitration participate in the selection of the
arbitrators, just as litigants do in the selection of juries, but not judges. The
party selection system raises the additional question, not presented by the
judicial decision-making literature, of whether party selection can mitigate or
eliminate the effect of characteristics that might bias the decision maker.
III. HYPOTHESES
Our hypotheses relate to a variety of characteristics that arbitrators bring
with them to the arbitration process. They are limited, of course, by our
ability to obtain data about individual arbitrators. The hypotheses are based
on the prior literature as described above, conversations with a number of
lawyers experienced in securities arbitration, our own experience testifying as
expert witnesses in arbitration cases, and our conjectures drawn from the
disclosures provided to the parties pursuant to the arbitrator selection
process.
As discussed in Section 2.2, FINRA procedures during our sample period
allowed arbitrators with certain connections to the securities industry to serve
as public arbitrators. Individuals who would be treated as industry arbitrators
under current rules were then treated as public arbitrators, either because their
work for the securities industry fell below a certain minimum threshold of
their overall business, or because they had retired from the industry and more
than three years had elapsed since their retirement. Arbitrator disclosure
forms, however, required the disclosure of industry experience. This
information was provided to the parties, enabling the parties to strike
arbitrators with these conflicts from the panel. As noted above, FINRA's
definition of public arbitrator has subsequently been tightened to make it
harder for persons associated at any time with the securities industry to serve
as public arbitrators.93
92 See Albert W. Alschuler, RacialQuolasandheJuy, 44 DUKE L.J. 704, 717-18 (1995).




Hpothesis 1: Arbitrators with connections to the securities industy will make smaller
awards.
Many arbitrators' professional backgrounds reveal substantial industry
experience, but not specific ties to the brokerage industry. Examples include
academics, regulators, attorneys engaged in transactional securities work, and
attorneys who primarily represented investors. These other sources of
securities experience are unlikely to be correlated with significant industry
bias. Indeed, to the extent that these arbitrators represent investors in other
proceedings, their predisposition may be pro-customer rather than pro-
industry. Thus, securities experience could cut either way, leading arbitrators
to be predisposed toward either the industry or the investor-claimants.
In addition, securities experience may give an arbitrator a more
sophisticated understanding of the issues involved in the case. As a result, and
because reported awards do not contain sufficient information for us to
benchmark or predict the size of an expected award, it is difficult to
determine the significance of differences in arbitration awards issued by
panels that reflect greater securities experience. Nonetheless, particularly in
light of the fact that critics and FINRA itself appear to have viewed the
potential for anti-customer bias as most significant,9 4 we postulate that
experience in the securities industry is more likely to make the arbitrator more
sympathetic to the industry.
Hpothesis 2: Professional arbitrators will make smaller awards.
Some research has questioned the effect of arbitrator incentives, in
particular the desire to be selected as an arbitrator in future cases. For
example, as noted above, KIement and Neeman hypothesize that arbitrators
tailor their awards to influence the perception of future parties.95 If arbitrators
want to be selected in future cases, they may skew arbitration awards in favor
of industry parties who are repeat players in securities arbitration. This effect
is likely to be greatest for professional arbitrators-those who devote
substantially all of their time to serving as arbitrators. Arbitrators whose
primary vocation is not dispute resolution and who serve as arbitrators only
occasionally are less likely to be influenced by the concern that their decisions
will affect their likelihood of being selected in future cases.
94 Id. It is noteworthy that none of FINRA's changes to the definition of public arbitrator
have attempted to address potential bias by arbitrators against the securities industry.
95 Klement & Neeman, supra note 84 at 1-3.
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Hjypothesis 3: Retired arbitrators will make smaller awards.
Another category of public arbitrators who may be anxious to be selected
as arbitrators are retired people. In addition to having a lower opportunity
cost for their time, our conversations with retired arbitrators suggested that
serving as an arbitrator was an interesting diversion that got them out of the
house. The relatively modest honorarium that arbitrators receive may also be
more economically important to a retired person who lacks a regular income.
A willingness to serve would give retired arbitrators an incentive similar to
that of professional arbitrators to curry favor with brokerage firms, who are
the repeat players in this process. Alternatively, some attorneys suggested to
us that older arbitrators may be more conservative, and therefore reluctant to
make large awards. Both of these factors suggest that older arbitrators would
tend to make lower awards.
Hjypothesis 4: Arbitrators with prior experience as regulators will make larger awards.
We are also interested in the effect of an arbitrator's experience as a
regulator on their awards. Regulators, who by the nature of their work deal
with a disproportionate number of wrongdoers, may develop a skepticism
toward the industry. Our hypothesis is that arbitrators with prior government
experience are likely to give more credence to claims of broker misconduct
and/or see greater need to deter such misconduct through larger awards.
Hjypothesis 5: Arbitrators who are compliance officers will make larger rewards.
Compliance officers play a quasi-regulatory role within brokerage firms.
In general, compliance officers are responsible for overseeing employee
screening, licensing, and trading, monitoring firm operational practices and
risk management, overseeing programs to safeguard customer information
and funds, and implementing programs to prevent misconduct, such as
money laundering and insider trading.96  In the course of this work,
96 See James A. Fanto, Advising Compliance in Financial Firms: A New Mission for the Legal
Academj, 8 BROOK.J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 1, 12 n. 56 (2013) (explaining that compliance
officers "oversee the screening process and background checks for employees, as well as
their licensing and qualifications; they establish and oversee anti-money laundering and
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act programs; they establish control programs for the
safeguarding of customer nonpublic personal information; and they oversee procedures
designed to prevent insider trading and other conflicts of interest"); see generaly SEC.
INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS'N, THE EVOLVING ROLE OF COMPLIANCE 2-5, 24-28 (2013),
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compliance officers are exposed to a wide range of actual and potential
broker misconduct. As a result, we conjecture that service as a compliance
officer, like past experience as a regulator, would cause arbitrators to be more
sympathetic to customer claims of broker misconduct and, as a result, to
grant larger awards.
Hjypothesis 6: The effects of the characteristics in Hypotheses 1 through 5 wi/i be reduced f
the claimant/respondent are represented b counsel.
As discussed above, party selection could conceivably reduce or eliminate
the effects described in Hypotheses 1 through 5; the information suggesting
the potential for arbitrator bias is available to the parties at the time that they
select the arbitration panel. We expect that parties are most likely to use this
information if they are represented by counsel. We postulate that attorneys
experienced in securities arbitration would have a sense of how these
characteristics are likely to affect their clients' case and would select
arbitrators accordingly, with the caveat that the limited pool of arbitrators
provided to the parties constrains their ability to select their ideal panel.
IV. EMPIRICAL TESTS
A. Description of Dataset
We obtained NASD arbitration awards from the FINRA arbitration
awards online site and from the LEXIS database. To generate a random set of
arbitrators, we randomly selected 417 arbitration awards involving investor
claimants for the years 1998 to 2000. We then limited our sample to
arbitration decisions that followed a hearing97 with a three-person panel, thus
excluding awards made by a single arbitrator. We only looked at arbitrations
where the chair and one panel arbitrator were public arbitrators and the other
panel arbitrator was an industry arbitrator. The decisions identified the
available at
http://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHaleSharedContent/Files/PDFs/
SIFMA-evolving-role-of-compliance-2013.pdf, on the role of the compliance officer.
97 A substantial percentage of arbitration claims are settled or resolved on the papers
without a live hearing. FINRA's website reports, for example, that for the period from
2010-2014, fewer than 20% of cases are resolved after a hearing, and that the majority of
cases are resolved through settlement. See Dispute Resolution Statistics, FINRA ARBITRATION
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members of the panel as well as indicated the arbitrator who served as the
panel chair.98 We removed arbitration awards where the arbitration resulted
solely in an unreported settlement; we included awards that reported a
settlement amount, as well as awards that gave a monetary award but also had
a partial unreported settlement. We also removed awards where we lacked
information on the amount of claimed compensation. This left us with a
sample of 381 observations.
Next, we collected data on the background of each of the arbitrators in
our sample from the arbitrator disclosure reports that we were able to obtain,
which we supplemented with information from other sources, such as the
Internet. We were able to obtain background data on approximately two-
thirds of the arbitrators appearing in our arbitration sample. Table 1 reports
the number of arbitration awards in our sample by year.







The dependent variable for our tests is the Compensation Ratio, defined as
the compensatory award (or settlement, if reported) divided by the requested
compensation amount.99 One potential weakness in this measure is that the
claimant decides how much to request as compensation, which creates room
for exaggeration. For example, claimants may request punitive or exemplary
damages as well as damages for pain and suffering. However, these are listed
9s Because of FINRA's selection procedures at the time of our study, the chairs are almost
all public arbitrators. In some cases, for reasons that we are unable to ascertain, decisions
in our sample reported that the panel was chaired by an industry arbitrator. We excluded
arbitrations with non-public chairs from the sample.
99 We use the Compensation Ratio, rather than the absolute level of compensation awarded,
as our dependent variable because we lack data on the actual damages suffered by the




separately in the arbitration award, which allows us to exclude them from our
measure of the requested compensatory amount. The requested
compensatory amount will typically turn on the number of securities involved
in a particular transaction multiplied by the losses the investor-claimant
incurred on the securities. Because information on the quantity of securities
traded (as well as the increase or decline in share price) is objective and easily
verifiable by the broker or brokerage firm respondent, claimants have limited
discretion with respect to the amount of compensation requested in that
respect.
A number of additional factors may affect the Compensation Ratio. To
control for these factors, our models include variables relating to the subject
matter of the dispute, selection of the dispute for arbitrator resolution, award,
and state in which the arbitration occurred. A list of the variable definitions is
provided in the Appendix.
Subject matter controls include indicator variables for six common areas
of arbitration. Suitability is defined to equal one if the arbitration involved a
suitability claim, including claims relating to NYSE Rule 405 "know your
customer" 100 and FINRA Rule 2111 (formerly NASD Rule 2310) issues,101
and zero otherwise. Other subject matter indicator variables include Churning
(a churning, excessive trading, or excessive commission claim), Unauthoriz ed
Trades, Failure to Execute (a failure to buy or sell as directed), Misrepresentation,
and Conversion (a claim of theft, conversion, unauthorized withdrawals, or self-
dealing). The base category consists of claims involving a non-specified
breach of contract or violation of fiduciary duty. Table 2 reports on the
frequency of the subject matter claims in our arbitration sample.
Misrepresentation (720/6) and suitability (47%) claims are the most common.
100 The "know your customer" rule requires member firms to "[u]se due diligence to learn
the essential facts relative to every customer [and] every order." Diligence as to Accounts,
NYSE Rule 405(1) (Sept. 8, 2008), available at
http://nyserules.nyse.com/NYSETools/bookmark.asp?id -sx-policymanual-
nyseConductofAccountsR401414&manual-/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/.
101 The "suitability requirement" states, "A member or an associated person must have a
reasonable basis to believe that a recommended transaction or investment strategy
involving a security or securities is suitable for the customer, based on the information
obtained through the reasonable diligence of the member or associated person to
ascertain the customer's investment profile. A customer's investment profile includes, but
is not limited to, the customer's age, other investments, financial situation and needs, tax
status, investment objectives, investment experience, investment time horizon, liquidity
needs, risk tolerance, and any other information the customer may disclose to the member
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We also include controls to address selection effects. Table 2 reports on
the settlements in our sample. The vast majority of settlements are
unreported; our sample includes a small number of settlements that are
reported-typically because only some of the respondents have settled. 10 2 In
those cases, the reported decision may or may not report the settlement
terms. The variable Reported Settlement is defined to equal one where the
arbitration resulted in a full or partial settlement and the settlement amount
was reported as part of the arbitration award (and included therefore in the
Compensation Ratio variable) and zero otherwise. Unreported Partial Settlement is
defined to equal one where the arbitration resulted in a partial settlement for
an unreported amount, and the award (if any) against the remaining non-
settling respondents was reported and zero otherwise. We expect that awards
in the case of an Unreported Partial Settlement should be lower due to the
settlement by a subset of the respondents, although the partial settlement may
correlate with the strength of the case.
Table 2 also provides summary statistics on our opinion controls.
Opinion controls focus on characteristics of the claim that may affect the
Compensation Ratio. Claimed Compensation is included because the absolute level
of compensation requested may affect the Compensation Ratio awarded.
Arbitrators may be less willing to grant a higher Compensation Ratio for larger
Claimed Compensation amounts, all other things being equal, simply because
they are reluctant to award large sums. Moreover, arbitrators may perceive a
large award against an individual broker or small firm as posing a risk of
insolvency. The mean Claimed Compensation for our sample is $291,000, but the
median is a much more modest $90,000. The Compensation Ratio is less
skewed, with a mean award of 38% of the claim and a median of 22%. To
account for possible non-linearity in the relationship between Compensation
Ratio and Claimed Compensation, we also include a squared term for Claimed
Compensation.
We include a control variable for arbitrator experience: Inexperienced is set
to one if the award is from the first year that the arbitrator appeared in the
dataset and zero otherwise. Arbitrators new to the job may be reluctant to
make large awards because it may reduce their chances for future selection by
brokerage firms and their attorneys-the repeat players in securities
arbitrations.
102 The strength of cases that settle may be different from those that do not settle. Moreover,
the claimants who settle are arguably more risk averse than those that do not, which may
affect their investment decisions as well.
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As an additional control, we include Top Accused Brokerage, which is set to
one if any of the respondents were one of the top ten brokerage firms as of
1998.103 A large brokerage firm may have repeat player advantages and greater
resources in defending those complaints, leading to lower awards.
Several opinion controls deal with the strength of the case; stronger cases
should result in a higher Compensation Ratio. Unfortunately, we have no
direct measure of the strength of a claimant's case, so we rely on three
proxies. First, Respondent Failed to Appear is set to equal one if the any of the
respondents failed to appear at the arbitration hearing and zero otherwise.
Respondents may not appear if their case is weak. Alternatively,
Respondents' failure to appear may lead the arbitrators to view their case as
less meritorious. In most cases, a default award will be entered against the
non-responding party. At least one respondent failed to appear in 23% of the
awards in our sample.
Second, we use a claimant's claim for punitive damages (Claimed Punitive
Damages) as a proxy for a relatively strong case. 104 Although punitive damages
can be (and are) claimed in connection with each of the claim types in our
classification, we hypothesize that claimants request punitive damages in cases
involving more egregious wrongdoing or where they have hard evidence of
fraud or other culpable misconduct. Many awards request an unspecified
amount of punitive damages. This measure may be relatively noisy, as some
lawyers will request punitive damages in every case, while others never do. We
set Claimed Punitive Damages as equal to one, however, only when the claimant
has claimed punitive damages with some specificity. Two situations fall within
this definition: (a) if the claimant requests a positive dollar amount of punitive
damages-fixing in the arbitrator's minds a precise amount of punitive
damages; and (b) if the award includes punitive damages, indicating that the
claimant pressed their claim for punitive damages during the hearing.
Third, our last proxy for the strength of the case, Claimed CRD
Expungement, is set to one if the respondents requested that the Central
Registration Depository ("CRD") record of any of the respondent-brokers be
103 SEC. INDUS. ASS'N, SECURITIES INDUSTRY YEARBOOK 1998-99, 6-7 (1998).
104 Punitive damages are intended to punish the wrongdoer rather than to compensate the
victim and are awarded in cases of particularly egregious misconduct. See, e.g., F. Warren
Jacoby, The Relationship of Punitve Damages and Compensalory Damages in Tort Acions, 75
DICK. L. REV. 585, 587 (1970) ("Punitive damages are not intended to remunerate the
injured party for the damages he may have sustained. They are not to compensate; they
are the penalty the law inflicts for gross, wanton, and culpable negligence, and are allowed
as a warning or as an example to defendant or others.").
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expunged, and zero otherwise. 105 FINRA maintains CRD records for active
brokers reflecting customer complaints and disciplinary proceedings. 106
Arbitrators may, at their discretion, choose to expunge the arbitration claim
from the CRD records for a broker involved in arbitration, subject to judicial
confirmation.01 We treat a respondent as requesting CRD expungement if:
(a) the respondent requested the expungement in the award summary; or (b)
there is an award of CRD expungement, indicating that the respondent
actively pursued expungement during the arbitration hearings. We treat a
request for CRD expungement as an indication that the respondents' case was
stronger relative to the claimants' case. We consider this proxy to be the
noisiest of the three case strength proxies in light of the consistent criticisms
leveled at arbitration panels for awarding expungement without an adequate
basis.10
To measure the complexity of the arbitration, we include in our opinion
controls the number of hearings in the arbitration (Number of Hearings) and the
length of the arbitration opinion (Opinion Length). Finally, our models include
geographic controls for the state in which the arbitration hearing took place,
which we treat as exogenous to the variables in our dataset. We include
indicator variables for the three states with the most arbitrations (New York,
Ca/i ornia, and Florida).
In Hypothesis H6, we postulate that the presence of an attorney may
have an effect on panel selection, which may in turn relate to arbitration
outcomes. To assess this possibility, we include in certain models indicator
variables coded as one if the claimant is represented by counsel (Claimant
Attorney) or the respondent is represented by counsel (Respondent Attorney), and
105 Customer complaints against brokers are reported in FINRA's CRD database and
available to the public to review by request. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, PROTECT YOUR
MONEY: CHECK OUT BROKERS AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS (2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/investor/brokers.htm (describing CRD database).
106 Id.
107 Under FINRA rules, courts may confirm expungement orders requiring FINRA be
named as a party only if "(A) the claim, allegation or information is factually impossible or
clearly erroneous"; "(B) the registered person was not involved in the alleged . ..
violation"; or "(C) the claim, allegation or information is false." FINRA Rules §
2080(b)(1) (2009), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid-2403&element-id-8468
Despite the limited grounds available for expungement, one study reports that
arbitration panels routinely grant expungement requests. See jean Eaglesham & Rob
Barry, Brokers Able to Hide Some Disputes, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2013.), available at
http://oline.wsj.com/news/articles/SB2000142405270230368040457913952010008336
0.
108 See Eaglesham & Barry, supra note 107.
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zero otherwise. In addition, better representation may lead directly to better
outcomes. Indeed, representation may correlate with case strength-claimants
with strong cases are more likely to be able to attract an attorney to work on a
contingency fee basis, while respondents with no defenses may not bother to
hire counsel. Claimants were represented by counsel in 87% of the cases;
respondents were represented in 82%.
Table 2. Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean Median Standar
Deviatio
Award ($ Thousands) 381 59.1 15.9 128.9
Compensation Ratio 381 0.343 0.144 0.388
Claimant Attorney 381 0.866 1.000 0.341
Respondent Attorney 381 0.829 1.000 0.377
Suitability 381 0.465 0.000 0.499
Churning 381 0.213 0.000 0.410
Unauthorized Trades 381 0.328 0.000 0.470
Failure to Execute 381 0.179 0.000 0.383
Misrepresentation 381 0.722 1.000 0.449
Conversion 381 0.037 0.000 0.188
Reported Settlement 381 0.005 0.000 0.072
Unreported Partial Settlement 381 0.045 0.000 0.207
Claimed Compensation ($ 381 0.291 0.090 0.850
millions)
Inexperienced 381 0.108 0.000 0.310
Top Accused Brokerage 381 0.092 0.000 0.289
Respondent Failed to Appear 381 0.218 0.000 0.413
Claimed Punitive Damages 381 0.307 0.000 0.462
Claimed CRD Expungement 381 0.150 0.000 0.357
Number of Hearings 381 5.462 5.000 4.209
Opinion Length 381 4.625 4.000 1.160
New York 381 0.142 0.000 0.349
California 381 0.226 0.000 0.419
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C. Industry Experience
Our first test attempts to disaggregate the effects of experience and
expertise by focusing on industry connections. We create an indicator
variable, Securities Expeence, which is set equal to one if the arbitrator was
primarily employed in the securities industry during the course of his or her
career or if the individual had done work for firms in the securities industry in
the five years prior to the arbitration, regardless of the amount; if not, the
variable equals zero. Table 3 reports the incidence of securities experience
among the public arbitrators in our sample. We classify the arbitrators
according to their position on the panel, distinguishing the public arbitrators
selected to be the Arbitration Chair from those serving in the second panel
position. At the time of our study, both the chair and the panel would have
been drawn from the same list of public arbitrators, but the chair would have
been ranked more highly by the parties, suggesting a greater consensus as to
that arbitrator.






The incidence of connections to the securities industry is surprisingly
high for individuals classified as public arbitrators. Recall that the connections
are disclosed on the arbitrator's disclosure form and arbitrators can be struck
for any reason. Nonetheless, 18.0% of the arbitrators serving as chairs had
some connection to the industry, along with 19.2% of the arbitrators serving
in the panel position.
To test the importance of the public arbitrators' connections to the
securities industry, we estimate the following equation for each award using
ordinary least squares and robust standard errors:
Compensation Ratioi = a + nSecutiesjndustgtChair
+ j 2SecuritiesIndustgyPanel + _f Subject Matter
+ YjIuOpinion Controls + _f ~State Controlsh + Year Effects + C
Model 1 of Table 4 reports our results.
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Table 4. Industry Experience Regressions
(1) (2)
Securities Experience Chair -0.413 -1.309
(-0.46) (-0.45)






Securities Experience Chair 1.056
* Claimant Attorney (0.34)
Securities Experience Panel 4.989*




Adj. R 2  0.310 0.341
Subject Matter Controls Yes Yes
Opinion Controls Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes
Note. Dependent variable for OLS regressions is the log odds of the
compensation ratio. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. T-statistics are
in parentheses. F-test for Securities Experience Chair + Securities Experience Chair
* Claimant Attorney = 0.7866. F-test for Securities Experience Panel + Securities
Experience Panel* Claimant Attorny = 0.5474.
+ Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
** Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
We find that the coefficients for Securities Industy Chair and Securities
Industgy Panel are both negative, but neither is significant. This finding does
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not support the hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) that panels with public arbitrators
who have connections to the securities industry tend to provide lower awards.
The potential for bias presented by affiliation with the securities industry
seems rather obvious, but the results in Model 1 suggest that it may not affect
outcomes. Nonetheless, given the role that the parties play in arbitrator
selection, it is difficult to understand why a claimant would ever allow an
arbitrator with connections to the industry to serve as a public arbitrator on a
panel. One reason may be that the claimant is not fully using the benefits of
the party selection process. Claimants, after all, are likely to be one-shot
players, and the party selection process differs from many other types of
dispute resolution. The use of claimants' counsel, who can add experience in
party selection, may be valuable here, and we hypothesize that counsel may
play an important role in the process by which panels are selected. To assess
this possibility, we estimate the model again, this time adding variables for
Claimant Attorney, Respondent Attorney, and interaction variables for
Securities Experience ChairClaimant Attorney and Securities Experience
Pane/*C/aimantAttorney. The interaction variables allow us to assess separately
the effect of connection to the securities industry on claimants who are
represented by counsel and those who are unrepresented. We present the
results in Model 2 of Table 4.
The results strongly support the hypothesis that unrepresented claimants
see lower awards when public arbitrators have connections to the securities
industry. The Securities Experience Panel coefficient captures the effect of
this characteristic on claimants who are unrepresented. It is negative in Model
2 with considerably greater magnitude than in Model 1. Moreover, the
coefficient estimate in Model 2 is significant at the 1% confidence level. The
coefficient for the interaction variable Securities Experience Panel*Claimant
Attorney, when summed with Securities Experience Pane, captures the effect of
this characteristic on claimants who have representation. The coefficient for
the interaction variable is positive and significant and the sum of the Securities
Experience Panel and Securities Experience Panel*Claimant Attorney is not
significantly different from zero (as reported in the F-test in the legend). This
finding suggests that lawyers play an important role in screening out even
obvious conflicts of interest. Conversely, unrepresented claimants appear to
be at a disadvantage in protecting themselves against conflicts of interest.10 9
109 We also looked at whether the chair or panel arbitrator was working in a securities firm or
as a banker at the time of the arbitration (Profession Secuirites-Banker). We re-estimated
Model 2 of Table 4, replacing Securities Experience Chair and Securities Experience Panel and




The results presented in Table 4 suggest that arbitrators with connections
to the securities industry tend to make lower awards. The effect of that
conflict of interest is essentially eliminated, however, when claimants are
represented by counsel. What about less obvious conflicts of interest? Do
they influence awards? If so, is that influence ameliorated by the presence of
counsel?
As indicated above, some commentators argue that arbitrators are
motivated by a desire to be selected in future cases. They hypothesize that
such arbitrators will tend to make lower awards in an effort to be more
attractive to respondents, who are typically repeat players (Hypothesis 2). Our
second test examines whether these professional arbitrators behave differently
from other arbitrators. To assess this possibility, we create an indicator
variable, Professional Arbitrator, coded to equal one if the arbitrator devotes
substantially all of his or her professional time to arbitration and mediation or
is described as self-employed, and zero otherwise. Table 5 reports the
incidence of professional arbitrators among the public arbitrators in our
sample. Professional arbitrators constitute 34.6% of the chairs, arguably the
most influential position, and 25.2% of the other public arbitrators.






and Profession Securlies-Banker Panel. Unreported, the coefficient on Profession Securities-
Banker Chair and Profession Securiies-Banker Panel are negative, similar with Model 2, but
only Profession Securilies-Banker Chair is significant (at the 1% level). The interaction terms
with Claimant Allorney are positive, similar with Model 2 of Table 4, but not significantly
different from zero. The sum of Profession Securilies-Banker Chair and the Profession Securities-
Banker Chair*Claiman t Attoy is negative and significant at the 10% level. The sum of
Profession Securities -Baker Panel and the Profession Securilies-Banker Panel Claimant Attorney is
not significantly different from zero. While a Claimant Attorney can mitigate the impact
of an arbitrator (this time the Chair) that works in the securities industry or as a banker,
the overall effect, as indicated by the sum of Profession Securiies-Banker Chair and the
Profession Securilies-Banker Chair*Claimant Attorne, is negative.
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We estimate the following equation for each award using ordinary least
squares and robust standard errors:
Compensation Ratioi = a +f iProfessional Arbitrator_Chairi
+ j 2Professional ArbitratorPanel + _f Subject Matter +
YAIOpinion Controlslu + y__State Controlsh + Year
Effects + -i
Model 1 of Table 6 reports our results.
Table 6. Professional Arbitrator Regressions
(1) (2)
Professional Arbitrator Chair 0.349 0.863
(0.64) (-0.55)






Professional Arbitrator Chair 1.541
* Claimant Attorney (0.93)
Professional Arbitrator Panel 0.413
* Claimant Attorney (0.23)
Constant 2.382 +  0.930
(1.84) (-0.50)
N 239 239
Adj. R 2  0.298 0.322
Subject Matter Controls Yes Yes
Opinion Controls Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes
Arbitrator Background
Note. Dependent variable for OLS regressions is the log odds of the
compensation ratio. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. T-statistics are
in parentheses. F-test for ProfessionalArbitrator Chair + ProfessionalArbitrator
Chair* Claimant Atorny = 0.2439. F-test for ProfessionalArbitrator Panel +
ProfessionalArbitrator Panel* Claimant Attorny = 0.0890
+ Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
** Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
The coefficient for ProfessionalArbitrator Chair is positive, but insignificant.
Recall that the parties generally must agree on this position. The coefficient
for ProfessionalArbitrator Panel, however, is negative and significant at the 5%
level. These results suggest that professional arbitrators are inclined to make
smaller awards, but only those who are serving as the second public
arbitrator, not the chair. These differing results based on the position of the
professional arbitrator suggest that this potential conflict of interest is a
subtler one. How does the effect interact with the presence of an attorney for
the claimant?
To assess this possibility, we re-estimate the model above adding
variables for Claimant Attorney, Respondent Attorney, as well as interaction
variables for Claimant Attorney and the two ProfessionalArbitrator variables. We
present the results of this regression in Table 6, Model 2. The coefficient for
Professional Arbitrator Panel is negative in this model and larger in magnitude,
albeit insignificant, which we attribute to the relatively small number of
observations in this category. The coefficient for the sum of Professional
Arbitrator Panel and Professional Arbitrator Panel*Claimant Attorney is also
negative and marginally significant (F-test significant at the 10% confidence
level). This suggests that attorneys do not completely ameliorate the potential
conflict of interest created by an arbitrator's potential desire to trim awards to
encourage future selection. We conjecture two possible explanations: (1) bias
of this sort is sufficiently subtle that even lawyers are not sensitive to it; or (2)
the constraints imposed on party selection limit the ability of claimants and
their counsel to reject arbitrators on this basis.
E. Retired Arbitrators
Retired arbitrators may face similar incentives as professional arbitrators.
To the extent that an arbitrator is retired, he may face fewer demands on his
time. The arbitrator's honorarium, albeit modest, may be more significant to
an arbitrator who is retired. As a result, retired arbitrators, like professional
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arbitrators, may be motivated to make lower awards to enhance their future
prospects of selection by broker-dealers (Hypothesis 3). To assess the effect
of retired arbitrators on the level of awards, we create an indicator variable set
equal to one if the arbitrator was retired at the time of the arbitration or over
the age of 65, and zero otherwise. Of course, some of the arbitrators in our
sample continued to work full time after the age of 65, but many did not,
even if they had not retired completely. Arbitrators who were only working
part time presumably had time available to take on more arbitration work.
Insofar as our coding treats some arbitrators who are working full time as
retired, it should bias against any significant finding.





Retired and older arbitrators make up a significant portion of the public
arbitrators in our sample. Retired chairs make up nearly a third of the sample
and over half of the arbitrators occupying the second public arbitrator
position.
To assess the effect of arbitrators on awards, we estimate the following
equation for each award using ordinary least squares and robust standard
errors:
Compensation Ratioi = a + @iiRetired Chair + ,2&RetiredPanel +
Y__f, Subject Matter, + Y1fOpinion Contro/sl + Yf State
Controlsx, + Year Effects + e
We present the results in Table 8.
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Table 8. Retired Arbitrator Regressions
(1) (2)
Retired Chair -0.983* 0.139
(-1.97) (0.10)




Respondent Attorney -1.563 +
(-1.69)
Retired Chair -1.244
* Claimant Attorney (-0.87)
Retired Panel 0.277




Adj. R 2  0.293 0.304
Subject Matter Controls Yes Yes
Opinion Controls Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes
Note. Dependent variable for OLS regressions is the log odds of the
compensation ratio. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. T-statistics are
in parentheses. F-test for Retired Chair + Retired Chair * Claimant Attorny =
0.0398. F-test for Retired Panel + Retired Panel* Claimant Attorney = 0.3126.
+ Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
** Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
For retired arbitrators, the chair position appears to be relevant. The
coefficient for Retired Arbitrator Chair is negative and significant at the 5%
level, while the coefficient for Retired Arbitrator Panel is positive, albeit
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insignificant. Examining the interaction between retired arbitrators and the
presence of a claimant attorney in Model 2, the coefficient for Retired
Arbitrator Chair is positive in this specification, albeit insignificant, suggesting
that claimants who are not represented by counsel do not face any
disadvantage when there is a retired chair. The coefficient for sum of Retired
Arbitrator Chair and the Retired Arbitrator Chair*Claimant Attorney interaction
variable is negative and significant at the 5% level. As with professional
arbitrators, this suggests that attorneys do not completely ameliorate the
potential conflict of interest created by a retired arbitrator's potential desire to
trim awards to encourage future selection. Our findings suggest that the
incentives of professional and retired arbitrators represent a more subtle type
of bias that may fly under the radar screen in the party selection process, even
with the aid of counsel.
F. Regulatory Experience
Our next set of tests looks at the effect of an arbitrator's experience as a
regulator on their awards. To assess the possibility that experience as a
regulator will incline an arbitrator to give more credence to claims of broker-
dealer misconduct (Hypothesis 4), we create an indicator variable equal to one
if the arbitrator has experience as a federal or state prosecutor, a federal or
state securities regulator, or a prior affiliation with a self-regulatory
organization, and zero otherwise.
In our earlier tests, we focused only on public arbitrators. For this set of
tests, we expand our scrutiny to include the industry arbitrator. We postulate
that industry arbitrators with a regulatory background may have a lower
tolerance for "bad apples" within the industry because misconduct by an
individual broker may undermine investor confidence in the industry
generally. Table 9 shows the incidence of experience as a regulator among our
three groups of arbitrators.
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Regulatory experience is relatively common among the arbitrators in our
sample, especially for industry arbitrators. Among the chairs, 14.7% had
regulatory experience, while 8.3% of the other public arbitrators had such
experience. For industry arbitrators, 10.9% had prior regulatory experience.
To test the effect of regulatory experience among arbitrators on the level
of awards, we estimate the following equation for each award using ordinary
least squares and robust standard errors:
Compensation Ratioi = a + fiRegulatorChair + j, Regu/atorPane/ +
__i Subject Matter, + Y1__Opinion Contro/ls + State Controls
+ Year Effects + -,
We present the results in Table 10.
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Table 10. Regulatory Experience Regressions
















































N 190 190 239 239
Adj. R2  0.337 0.342 0.219 0.222
Subject Matter Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls
Opinion Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Note. Dependent variable for OLS regressions is the log odds of the
compensation ratio. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.T-statistics are in
parentheses. From Model 2: F-test for Regulator Chair + Regulator Chair
Respondent Attorny = 0.1699; F-test for Regulator Panel + Regulator Panel
Respondent Attorny = 0.0047. From Model 4: F-test for Regulator Industgy +
Regulator Industy * Claimant Attorny = 0.6268.
+ Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
** Coefficient significant at less than the 1% level.
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, we find in Model 1 that the coefficients for
Regulator Chair and Regulator Panel are both positive. Only the latter is
significant, however, at the 1% level.
In our prior analyses, we assessed the interaction of the presence of an
attorney for the claimant with the arbitrator background characteristic of
interest. For this set of regressions, however, our hypothesis is that regulatory
experience will lead arbitrators to be harder on respondents. Accordingly, we
want to see if the presence of an attorney for the respondent mitigates the
tendency of public arbitrators with regulatory experience to give larger
awards.110 In Model 2 of Table 10 we add variables for Claimant Attorney,
Respondent Attorney, and interaction variables for Respondent Attorney and the
Regulator Chair and Regulator Panel indicator variables. The coefficients for
Regulator Chair and Regulator Chair*Respondent Attorney are insignificant in this
model, as is the sum of Regulator Chair and Regulator ChairRespondent Attorney.
Similarly, the coefficients for Regulator Panel and Regulator Panel*Respondent
Attorney are insignificant in this model, although the sum of Regulator Panel and
Regulator Panel*Respondent Attorney is positive and significantly different from
zero. Excluding the positive coefficient on Regulator Panel + Regulator
Panel*Respondent Attorney (which is difficult to interpret given the lack of
significant coefficients for Regulator Panel and Regulator Panel*Respondent
Attorney separately), we do not find substantial evidence that the regulatory
experience on the part of a public arbitrator affects the size of the arbitration
award.
We also assess the effect of industry arbitrators with regulatory
experience, substituting Regulator Industgy for the two public arbitrator
variables used in the model above. We present the results in Models 3 and 4
110 Importantly, as discussed above, the presence of a plaintiffs' attorney may be a proxy for
case quality; the presence of a respondent attorney is less likely to correlate with case
quality.
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of Table 10. We see in Model 3 that the coefficient for Regulator Industgy is
positive, but small in magnitude and insignificant.
Given the small magnitude of the coefficient, we decided to re-estimate
the model two different ways. First, we estimated the model with an
interaction variable, Regulator Industy*Respondent Attornye, similar to Model 2 in
Table 10. Both Regulator Industgy and the interaction variable were insignificant
in this model, which we have not tabulated. We then re-estimated the model
with an interaction variable, Regulator Industy*Claimant Attorney. Our rationale
for doing so was that claimant attorneys may play a role in identifying
industry arbitrators who were more likely to be generous to their clients. We
present the results of this regression in Model 4 of Table 10.
We see that the coefficient for Regulator Industy is negative in this
estimation, albeit not significant at conventional levels. The coefficient for the
sum of this variable and the variable interacting Regulator Industgy with Claimant
Attorney is positive, but also insignificant. These findings suggest that prior
experience as a regulator among industry arbitrators does not have a
significant effect on awards. Although our data does not allow us to ascertain
the reason for this finding, it is possible that regulators have a reduced
tolerance for weak cases or, alternatively, that industry ties outweigh regulator
effects.
G. Compliance Officers
For our final set of tests, we wanted to see if employment as a
compliance officer with a broker-dealer would have an effect on arbitration
awards. We posit that compliance officers, like former regulators, may have
more familiarity with broker misconduct and therefore may be inclined to
make higher awards (Hypothesis 5). Table 11 shows the incidence of
experience as a compliance officer in our sample.
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The incidence of experience as a compliance officer is relatively low for
the public arbitrators in our sample (2.7% for chairs and 4.0% for the public
panel member), but quite common among the industry arbitrators (43.2%).
Because individuals largely self-select into the pool of available arbitrators, it
is possible that industry members with compliance experience are more
interested in the arbitration process. Without knowing the breakdown for the
overall pool of actual and potential industry participants, however, we can
only speculate in this regard.
Given the prevalence of compliance officers among the industry
arbitrators, we focus our tests on them. We estimate the following equation
for each award using ordinary least squares and robust standard errors:
Compensation Ratioi = a + fiCompiance Industgy + Yf Subject Matter +
YjIuOpinion Controls + _SjState Controls +Year Effects + 8
We present the results in Table 12.
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Adj. R 2  0.245 0.251
Subject Matter Yes Yes
Controls
Opinion Controls Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes
Note. Dependent variable for OLS regressions is the log odds of the
compensation ratio. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. T-statistics are
in parentheses. F-test for Compliance Industgy + Compliance Industy * Claimant
Attorney = 0.5569.
+ Coefficient significant at the 10% level or less.
Coefficient significant at the 5% level or less.
** Coefficient significant at less than the 10% level.
The coefficient for the Compliance Industgy variable is insignificant in
Model 1. In Model 2, we add Claimant Attorney, Respondent Attorney, as well as
an interaction variable for Claimant Attorne and the Compliance Industfy
variable. The coefficient for Compliance Indusfy, which represents the effect
that such arbitrators have on awards when the claimant is not represented by
counsel, is negative, with a relatively large magnitude, but it just misses
significance at conventional significance levels (10.3%). The sum of the
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coefficient of this variable and the interaction variable is positive, but also
insignificant. These results are only suggestive that the presence of counsel
may make a difference. As with regulators, our findings may be based, in part,
on the uncertain effect that a compliance background may have on the
manner in which an arbitrator approaches a customer dispute.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Our empirical results are consistent with the literature on judicial decision
making: Arbitrator characteristics appear to matter for arbitrator outcomes.
Specifically, we find that, for the public arbitrators, industry experience is
correlated with statistically significant decreases in arbitration awards for
claimants who are not represented by counsel. This finding lends support to
FINRA's decision to restrict arbitrators with even a modest amount of
securities experience from serving as public arbitrators. The finding also lends
support to the concern that arbitrators with industry experience tend to
disfavor claimants.
We caution, however, that our findings do not necessarily demonstrate
arbitrator bias. In the absence of detailed information about the claims, the
merits, and the bases for the arbitrators' awards, we have no benchmark
against which to evaluate individual awards for "correctness." That is to say, if
two panels issued different awards in similar cases, we would have no basis
for determining which award was more appropriate.
Our results also provide modest support for theoretical claims that
professional and retired arbitrators may have incentives to issue lower awards
than other arbitrators and that they, in fact, act in accordance with those
incentives. We find that professional arbitrators who do not serve as the panel
chair correlate with a statistically significant decrease in awards. Similarly,
public chairs who are retired correlate with smaller awards. Our work suggests
that arbitrator incentives are important, and that FINRA may want to take
such incentives into account in one form or another. Possible options could
include modifying the qualification criteria, limiting the number of panels on
which a particular arbitrator can sit, or limiting the total amount of income
that an individual can earn as a FINRA arbitrator. Of course, any reforms of
this sort would have to be weighed against the cost of limiting the available
pool of arbitrators.
Looking at prior regulatory experience, we find some evidence that public
arbitrators with regulatory experience are inclined toward granting larger
awards if they do not serve as the panel chair. Finally, we find marginally
9:43 (2014)
Virnia Law & Business Review
significant evidence that there is a difference in awards if the industry
arbitrator has experience as a compliance officer. These effects, although
modest, are in the predicted direction and consistent with the literature
identifying a correlation between judicial preferences/ideology and case
outcomes.
With respect to the role of counsel, we find similarly mixed effects. Legal
representation appears to mitigate but not eliminate the effect of industry
experience, such that unrepresented litigants suffer the most from the effect
of "industry bias." In contrast, claimants' attorneys do not appear to be
sensitive to the incentive effects of being a professional or retired arbitrator.
Although we find limited effects from these characteristics, the effects are not
eliminated by the presence of counsel, suggesting that characteristics such as
retirement or professional arbitrator may create biases that are less visible to
counsel than industry experience. From a practical perspective, our findings
suggest that counsel may want to focus more on these characteristics in the
selection process. By contrast, effects of regulatory and compliance officer
experience are greatly affected by legal representation, suggesting that counsel
do, in fact, focus on these characteristics.
VI. CONCLUSION
In an ideal dispute resolution system, the background of an arbitrator
would not influence the outcome in arbitration. Each arbitrator would rule
impartially, unaffected by his or her prior experiences or future incentives.
The reality, however, is that securities arbitration, like other systems of
adjudication, cannot achieve that ideal of impartiality. FINRA has recognized
the importance of an arbitrator's background in its increasingly stringent
qualification requirements. This paper sheds empirical light on whether those
changes are likely to affect case outcomes.
We conclude that, although our results are mixed, arbitrator
characteristics do affect case outcomes. Specifically, we find that experience in
the securities industry, the characteristic at the core of FINRA's revisions to
the definition of a public arbitrator, correlates with significantly smaller
awards in cases in which the customer is not represented by counsel. Our
findings suggest that FINRA may have been justified in imposing increasingly
stringent limitations on the category of public arbitrators, and that disclosure
alone was insufficient to protect customers from arbitrator bias. More
speculatively, this finding suggests that claimants may do better by opting for
panels of all public arbitrators.
9:43 (2014)
Arbitrator Background
With respect to other categories, our findings lend modest support for
researchers who theorize that more general characteristics of arbitrators and
their backgrounds are also important. Specifically our findings warn that
attorneys may be paying insufficient attention to other important arbitrator
characteristics.
At the same time, our research suggests a critical role for the attorney in
FINRA arbitrations and suggests that unrepresented parties are particularly
vulnerable to the risk of arbitrator bias. The party selection process-which
in theory empowers both claimants and respondents-may create particular
disadvantages for parties who are not represented by counsel.
Supporters of arbitration often highlight its streamlined proceedings and
low costs compared to litigation as an advantage for small claimants.1 Our
findings suggest that, even with streamlined procedures, claimants who lack
attorneys may face an uphill battle. Moreover, our findings suggest that the
effectiveness of party selection depends in part on access to counsel
experienced in the selection procedure. At the same time, however, our
findings suggest that counsel may not be fully effective in screening for
subtler forms of bias, such as an arbitrator's desire to be selected in future
cases.
111 See Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 59, 103 (2010) (warning that
eliminating mandatory arbitration of customer disputes is likely to have a negative impact
on retail investors).
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable Definition
Compensation Ratio The total amount of compensation award divided








Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration
involved a suitability claim, including claims
involving "know your customer," NYSE Rule
405, and NASD Rule 2310 issues, and 0
otherwise.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration
involved a churning, excessive trading, or
excessive commission claim and 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration
involved an unauthorized trading claim and 0
otherwise.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration
involved a claim that the broker or brokerage firm
failed to execute a transaction, failed to monitor
an account properly, improperly executed a
transaction, or engaged in activities that resulted
in errors in a customer account and 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration
involved misrepresentation, fraud, failure to
disclose, Rule 1Ob-5, common law fraud, or
deceptive sales tactic claim and 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration
involved a theft, conversion, unauthorized


















Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration
resulted in a full or partial settlement and the
settlement amount was reported and 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitration
resulted in a partial settlement and the settlement
amount was not reported (but the award for the
non-settling respondents was reported) and 0
otherwise.
Amount of claimed compensation in dollars by
the arbitration claimants.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the award is from
the first year the arbitrator appears in the dataset
and 0 otherwise.
Indicator Variable equal to 1 if any of the
respondents was one of the top 10 brokerage
firms of 1998.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the any of the
respondents failed to appear at the arbitration
hearing and 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if punitive damages
were imposed on any of the respondents in the
arbitration award and 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CRD records
of any of the respondent-brokers was expunged
and 0 otherwise.
Number of hearings for the arbitration.
Number of pages in the award opinion.
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Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator's
primary career experience was in the securities
industry or the arbitrator had worked for a
securities firm within the last 5 years, and 0
otherwise.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator
primarily works as arbitrator or is self-employed
and 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator is
retired or over age 65 at the time of arbitration
and 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator has
experience as a federal or state prosecutor, federal
or state securities regulator, or with a self-
regulatory organization, and 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the arbitrator has
experience as a compliance officer with a broker-
dealer, and 0 otherwise.
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